Abstract. Michael Titelbaum (2015) has recently argued that the Enkratic Principle is incompatible with the view that rational belief is sensitive to higher-order defeat. That is to say, if it cannot be rational to have akratic beliefs of the form "p, but I shouldn't believe that p," then rational beliefs cannot be defeated by higher-order evidence, which indicates that they are irrational. In this paper, I distinguish two ways of understanding Titelbaum's argument, and argue that neither version is sound. The first version can be shown to rest on a subtle, but crucial, misconstrual of the Enkratic Principle. The second version can be resisted through careful consideration of cases of higher-order defeat. The upshot is that proponents of the Enkratic Principle are free to maintain that rational belief is sensitive to higher-order defeat.
Introduction
Two theses about epistemic rationality have attracted a lot of attention recently. First, the Enkratic Principle: the thesis that it is never rational to have akratic beliefs of the form "p, but I shouldn't believe that p." Second, the thesis that higher-order defeat is possible, that is, the thesis that even fully rational beliefs can be defeated by sufficiently strong higher-order evidence, which indicates that they are irrational.
Michael Titelbaum (2015) has recently argued that the Enkratic Principle is incompatible with the possibility of higher-order defeat. That is to say, if akratic beliefs are never rational, then rational beliefs cannot be defeated by misleading higher-order evidence. In this paper, I distinguish two ways of understanding Titelbaum's argument, and argue that neither version is sound. The first version can be shown to rest on a subtle, but crucial, misconstrual of the Enkratic Principle. In brief, the mistake is to think that the Enkratic Principle amounts to the claim that there are certain falsehoods about the requirements of rationality that it can never be rational to believe. Properly understood, the Enkratic Principle says something importantly different, namely that there are certain epistemic situations that one cannot occupy while being rationally permitted to believe certain falsehoods about the requirements of rationality. Once this misunderstanding is cleared away, the first version of Titelbaum's argument loses its force. The second version can, I argue, be resisted through careful consideration of cases of higher-order defeat.
Here is the plan. In §2, I introduce some terminology and notation that I will be using, in § §3-4, to give more precise formulations of the Enkratic Principle and the view that higherorder defeat is possible. In §5, I review Titelbaum's argument for the claim that the Enkratic Principle is incompatible with the possibility of higher-order defeat. In §6, I suggest two ways of understanding Titelbaum's argument, and argue that the argument fails on either understanding. I conclude, in §7, that proponents of the Enkratic Principle are free to maintain that rational belief is sensitive to higher-order defeat.
Preliminaries
On one intuitive picture of rational belief, the recommendations of epistemic rationality describe a function, call it 'R', from possible epistemic situations to sets of doxastic states, where a doxastic state corresponds to a set of doxastic attitudes towards different propositions. If s denotes an epistemic situation, R(s) denotes the set of doxastic states that someone who occupies s is rationally permitted to be in. Accordingly, we can use R to give a simple model of what it means for a doxastic attitude to be rationally permitted or required in a given epistemic situation:
Rational Permission: A doxastic attitude A is rationally permitted in an epistemic situation s iff A ∈ d, for some doxastic state d ∈ R(s).
Rational Requirement: A doxastic attitude A is rationally required in an epistemic situation s iff A ∈ d, for every doxastic state d ∈ R(s).
According to this model, a doxastic attitude is rationally permitted in an epistemic situation just in case the attitude is part of at least one of the doxastic states that it is rational to adopt if one occupies that situation; and a doxastic attitude is rationally required in an epistemic situation just in case the attitude is part of every doxastic state that it is rational to adopt if one occupies that situation. 1 Derivatively, I will say that a doxastic attitude is rationally forbidden just in case it is not rationally permitted.
I will make two simplifying assumptions about the function R. First, I will assume that whenever a doxastic attitude is rationally required, the attitude is also rationally permitted.
This amounts to assuming that every epistemic situation rationally permits at least one (nonempty) doxastic state. Second, I will assume that doxastic attitudes are binary, rather than graded. That is, I will be talking about belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment, rather than levels of confidence or credences. But otherwise I will not make any substantive assumptions about R at this point. In particular, I will not assume that R validates the Uniqueness Thesis, according to which any epistemic situation rationally permits at most one doxastic attitude towards any given proposition; nor will I assume that R never gives rise to epistemic dilemmas, that is, situations where two (or more) incompatible doxastic attitudes are both rationally required.
2 By staying neutral on such theses, there should be no risk of begging any interesting questions from the outset.
The Enkratic Principle
Philosophers have long discussed and, for the most part, endorsed a principle of practical enkrasia, according to which it is never rational to intend (or fail to intend) to perform an action that one judges one should (or should not) perform. 3 If I intend to sell my house despite judging that I should keep it, something appears rationally flawed about my state of mind;
and likewise if I judge that I should sell my house, but nonetheless intend to keep it. Someone who does not intend to act in accordance with his or her own best overall judgment fails to be rational by his or her own lights, and such a failure has struck many as an obvious case of irrationality.
4
More recently, epistemologists have drawn attention to an analogous principle of epistemic enkrasia, according to which it is never rationally permissible to have a belief that one believes to be rationally forbidden; or, conversely, fail to have a belief that one believes to be rationally required. If I believe that it is raining, despite believing that I am rationally forbidden believe that is is raining, something appears rationally flawed about my state of 2 For discussions of the Uniqueness Thesis, see Levinstein (2015) , Schoenfield (2014) , Titelbaum and Kopec (2016) , White (2005) , among others. For discussions of epistemic dilemmas, see Christensen (2007b; 2010; , Lasonen-Aarnio (2014), and Worsnip (2015) . 3 Discussions of practical akrasia go back as far as to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (Book VII, Chs. 1-10). For early modern discussions of practical akrasia, see Davidson (1970) and Hare (1952) . 4 Although see Arpaly (2000) , Audi (1990), and McIntyre (1990) for authors who doubt that practical akrasia need always be irrational.
mind; and likewise if I believe that I am rationally required to believe that it is raining, but nonetheless fail to so believe. Just as it seems irrational to act against one's best judgment about how one ought to act, it seems irrational to believe against one's best judgment of what one ought to believe.
We can use the model of epistemic rationality introduced in the previous section to give a slightly more precise formulation of the view that epistemic akrasia is never rational: The first clause says that it is never rationally permissible to have a doxastic attitude that one believes to be rationally forbidden in one's epistemic situation. For example, it is never rationally permissible to believe that it is raining, while also believing that one's epistemic situation rationally forbids believing that it is raining. The second clause says that it is never rationally permissible to fail to have a doxastic attitude that one believes to be rationally required in one's epistemic situation. For example, it is never rationally permissible to fail to believe that it is raining, while also believing that one is rationally required to believe that it is raining. As such, the Enkratic Principle imposes two constraints on rational belief, corresponding to two ways in which one might be epistemically akratic: either by having an attitude that one believes to be forbidden, or by failing to have an attitude that one believes to be required.
How plausible is the Enkratic Principle, thus understood? From an intuitive standpoint, akratic beliefs undoubtedly seem rationally flawed. Statements like "it's raining, but I shouldn't believe it" strike us as incoherent in much the same way as Moorean statements like "it's raining, but I don't believe it." 5 But philosophers have reacted very differently to the intuitive oddness of epistemic akrasia. Some authors accept the Enkratic Principle largely without argument; see, e.g., Scanlon (1998 ), Bergmann (2005 ), Feldman (2005 ), and Broome (2007 . Others try to back the Enkratic Principle up by substantive argument; see, e.g., Greco
(2014) and Kolodny (2005, pp. 521-27 ). Yet others call the Enkratic Principle into doubt, 5 See Horowitz (2013) for a detailed discussion of the intuitive oddness of epistemic akrasia. For related discussions of Moore's paradox, see Green and Williams (2007) and Smithies (2012 Christensen (2016) argues that agents who rationally believe themselves to be anti-reliable-that is, agents who rationally believe themselves to be more likely than not to make an incorrect judgment of their total evidence-must sometimes be epistemically akratic in order to maximize the expected accuracy of their beliefs. If so, and if accuracy trumps enkrasia, there is pressure to
give up the Enkratic Principle.
I will not try to evaluate these (and other related 6 ) arguments for or against the Enkratic Principle. My aim here is not to assess the overall viability of the Enkratic Principle, but to argue for its compatibility with the view that rational belief is sensitive to higher-order defeat.
Henceforth, I will therefore put aside whatever other qualms one might have about the Enkratic Principle.
Higher-Order Defeat
As Christensen (2010, p. 185) We can use the model of epistemic rationality introduced in the previous section to give a more precise formulation of the view that rational belief is sensitive to higher-order defeat:
Possibility of Higher-Order Defeat: It is possible for a rationally permitted doxastic state d to be defeated by sufficiently strong higher-order evidence, which indicates that d is rationally forbidden.
Three comments about this view are in order. First, note that higher-order evidence must be misleading to have defeating force. Non-misleading higher-order evidence will either indicate that a rational belief state is rational (in which case the belief state is not defeated), or indicate that an irrational belief state is irrational (in which case the belief state is already irrational, and hence not defeasible). So, in contrast to ordinary first-order evidence, only misleading higher-order evidence can serve as a defeater.
7 See, e.g., Christensen (2010; , Horowitz and Sliwa (2015) , Schoenfield (2016) , and Worsnip (2015) .
Second, the clsaim that higher-order defeat is possible should not be confused with the claim that self-misleading evidence is possible. Self-misleading evidence is a synchronic phenomenon, whereby a body of evidence supports a falsehood about what it itself supports.
For example, if my evidence supports that it's raining, while also supporting that my evidence doesn't support that it's raining, then my evidence is self-misleading. By contrast, higherorder defeat is a diachronic phenomenon, whereby a doxastic attitude, which is initially rational, becomes irrational at a later stage due to the acquisition of a body of misleading higher-order evidence. As such, cases of higher-order defeat are ipso facto not cases of selfmisleading evidence, since the doxastic attitude, which the higher-order evidence says is irrational, in fact ends up being irrational.
It remains an open question whether selfmisleading evidence is indeed possible, and whether the Enkratic Principle is compatible with the possibility of self-misleading evidence.
8 But this as it may; the issue at stake here is whether the Enkratic Principle is compatible with the possibility of higher-order defeat, understood as a diachronic phenomenon.
Finally, the distinction between first-order and higher-order defeat should be distinguished from the familiar distinction, due to Pollock (1974) , between rebutting and undercutting defeat. As pointed out by Christensen (2010) , DiPaolo (forthcoming), and others, higher-order defeat is importantly different from undercutting defeat in a number of respects. However, we still lack a comprehensive understanding of how, exactly, higher-order defeat fits into a broader picture of epistemic defeat, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to address these wider issues. For present purposes, it suffices to have at least an initial grasp of the distinction between first-order and higher-order defeat.
How plausible is it that rational belief is sensitive to higher-order defeat? According to a prominent line of defense, due to Christensen (2007; 2010; 2011) , those who maintain that higher-order defeat is impossible are committed to an implausible form of dogmatism about our own cognitive abilities. We may use the Parental Bias case to illustrate the point: if Mary disregards the study on the parental bias, she must take the study to be misleading. But the study is only misleading if Mary's initial evaluation of Peter was in fact unbiased. So if Mary disregards the study, she must assume that her initial evaluation of Peter was unbiased. Yet, in doing so, she seems to beg the question in much the same way as someone who disregards a body of evidence merely on the grounds that it opposes his or her prior opinion. To avoid this sort of dogmatic reliance on her own cognitive abilities, Christensen maintains, Mary should lower her evaluation of Peter's abilities upon learning about the parental bias.
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Another defense of the Possibility of Higher-Order Defeat may be derived from Elga's (2007) "bootstrapping" objection against the Right Reasons View of peer disagreement.
According to the Right Reasons View, when two epistemic peers discover that they disagree about some proposition p, the peer who is in the right (that is, the peer who initially judged the shared body of evidence correctly) is rationally permitted to retain her initial belief about p in light of the disagreement. Elga's objection against this view goes by way of reductio:
suppose that, if two epistemic peers a and b find themselves in disagreement, the peer who is right, say a, is rationally permitted to retain her initial opinion about the disputed proposition.
Presumably, this means that a is thereby justified in concluding that b is wrong, and hence justified in concluding that b is (at least to some extent) epistemically inferior to a with respect to the matter of dispute. Yet, it seems absurd to suppose that the mere fact that b disagrees with a should makes it rational for a to conclude that b is epistemically inferior to a. 
Titelbaum Against Higher-Order Defeat
Let us now consider Titelbaum's reasons for thinking that the Enkratic Principle is incompatible with the Possibility of Higher-Order Defeat. I will reconstruct his argument in three steps. In doing so, I will deviate to some extent from Titelbaum's own exposition. But the reconstruction should amount to a charitable interpretation of his argument. rationally permits believing a falsehood about which doxastic attitudes s rationally requires or forbids.
The label alludes to Titelbaum's so-called "Fixed Point Thesis," according to which "no
[epistemic] situation rationally permits an a priori false belief about which overall [doxastic] states are rationally permitted in which situations" (Titelbaum 2015, p. 261) . As Titelbaum puts his thesis in a slogan: "mistakes about the requirements of rationality are mistakes of rationality" (Titelbaum 2015, p. 253 Current Situation Thesis: It cannot be rationally permissible to be mistaken about those propositions in Prat that concern which doxastic attitudes one's current epistemic situation rationally requires or forbids, but it can be rationally permissible to be mistaken 13 Strictly speaking, this step of the argument relies on a (relatively weak) evidentialist thesis, since an inference is drawn from what Mary's evidence supports to what she is rationally permitted to believe. However, since anyone who accepts the Possibility of Higher-Order Defeat is committed to this evidentialist thesis, Titelbaum gets the relevant version of evidentialism for free. For further discussion of evidentialism, see Conee and Feldman (1985; 2004) and Shah (2006) . 14 An anonymous reviewer has rightly pointed out that this line of reasoning presupposes a relatively fine-grained individuation of epistemic situations. More specifically, it is assumed that epistemic situations are sufficiently fine-grained to make it the case that Mary indeed transitions to a new epistemic situation when she learns about the parental bias. For present purposes, I shall simply grant a fine-grained individuation of epistemic situations, since my qualms about Titelbaum's argument lie elsewhere.
about those propositions in Prat that do not concern which doxastic attitudes one's current epistemic situation rationally requires or forbids.
The Current Situation Thesis is equivalent to the conjunction of the Substantive Enkratic Obviously, Titelbaum grants, one might try to come up with alternative accounts of how we acquire justification for propositions in Prat. But regardless of what the correct account turns out to be, the thought goes, it seems implausible to suppose that the kind of justification that one can get for a given proposition in Prat should depend on which epistemic situation one currently occupies. And if so, it is implausible to suppose that whether or not one can be rationally mistaken about a given proposition in Prat should depend on which epistemic 
Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat
I take the first two steps of Titelbaum's argument to be uncontroversial: it is easily verified that the Enkratic Principle entails the Substantive Enkratic Principle, and it should be equally clear that adherents of the Possibility of Higher-Order Defeat are committed to the No Fixed Point
Thesis. The culprit is the third step of the argument, which seeks to show that the Substantive Enkratic Principle is incompatible with the No Fixed Point Thesis (or, equivalently, that the Current Situation Thesis is false). In this section, I will begin by distinguishing two ways in which one might understand the third step of Titelbaum's argument, and then argue that the argument fails on either understanding.
The two ways of understanding the third step of Titelbaum's argument correspond to two ways of understanding the explanatory challenge that Titelbaum raises for the proponent of the Current Situation Thesis. On one understanding, the explanatory challenge concerns the kind of justification that one can acquire for various propositions in Prat. Thus understood, the challenge is that of explaining why one cannot acquire all-things-considered misleading justification for those propositions in Prat that concern one's current epistemic situation, when one can acquire all-things-considered misleading justification for those that do not. On another understanding, the explanatory challenge concerns the kind of justification that one can have for various propositions in Prat. Thus understood, the challenge is that of explaining why one cannot have all-things-considered misleading justification for those propositions in
Prat that concern one's current epistemic situation, when one can have all-things-considered misleading justification for those that do not. 16 These two explanatory challenges are indeed distinct: the justification that one has in a given epistemic situation can (and typically does) come apart from the justification that one can acquire in that epistemic situation. Even if I lack justification to believe that the sun is shining, I might acquire such justification. The fact that I presently lack the justification does nothing to prevent me from acquiring it. So the two interpretations of Titelbaum's explanatory challenge are importantly different, and should be evaluated separately.
Let me begin by considering the first interpretation of Titelbaum's challenge to the proponent of the Current Situation Thesis. This version of the challenge, I shall argue, rests on a subtle, but crucial, misconstrual of the Substantive Enkratic Principle. The mistake is to think that the Substantive Enkratic Principle amounts to the claim that there are certain 16 I am grateful to Maria Lasonen-Aarnio for bringing the latter interpretation to my attention.
propositions in Prat-those propositions that concern which doxastic attitudes one's current epistemic situation requires or forbids-that one can never be rationally mistaken about. In other words, the mistake is to think that the Substantive Enkratic Principle says that there is a Greco (2014) describes the Enkratic Principle as "puzzling" on the following grounds:
[T]he claim that epistemic akrasia is always irrational amounts to the claim that a certain sort of justified false belief-a justified false belief about what one ought to believe-is impossible. But justified false beliefs seem to be possible in any domain, and it's hard to see
why beliefs about what one ought to believe should be an exception. (Greco 2014, p. 201) In a similar vein, Littlejohn (2015) takes the Enkratic Principle to say that there is "a special class of propositions about the requirements of rationality that we cannot make rational mistakes about" (Littlejohn 2015, p. 1) , and he describes this result as "surprising" because:
You might think that there can be rational mistakes about just about anything. The best evidence might be misleading. If it's good enough evidence, it might make mistakes reasonable. (Littlejohn 2015, p. 5) On one very natural reading of these passages, Greco and Littlejohn both take the Enkratic Principle to say that there are certain false propositions about the requirements of rationality that it is never rationally permissible to believe. If this were the case, the Enkratic Principle would indeed be a puzzling thesis (at least for those who think that justified false beliefs are possible across all subject-matters 17
). But as we have seen, the Enkratic Principle does not say that justified false beliefs are impossible for certain propositions in Prat. All the Enkratic Principle says is that there are certain epistemic situations that one cannot occupy while being permitted to believe certain false propositions in Prat. As such, the Enkratic Principle does not have the kinds of puzzling consequences for the possibility of justified false beliefs about the requirements of rationality that Greco and Littlejohn seem to think.
Let us now turn to the second interpretation of Titelbaum's challenge to the proponent of the Current Situation Thesis. While this statement of the challenge does not rest on any misconstrual of the Substantive Enkratic Principle, I will argue that the challenge is benign.
To begin with, note that there is nothing puzzling about a thesis that implies that one cannot have all-things-considered misleading justification for such-and-such propositions in suchand-such epistemic situations. In other words, there is nothing puzzling about a thesis that imposes constraints on which epistemic situations an agent can occupy while being permitted or required to have certain doxastic attitudes towards certain propositions. After all, that's just what the requirements of rationality are supposed to do. So, the mere fact that the Current Situation Thesis imposes constraints on which mistakes it can be rational to make in one's current epistemic situation hardly constitutes an explanatory challenge to the proponent of the Current Situation Thesis. The challenge, if there is one, must lie elsewhere.
Instead, one might take the second version of the challenge to be that of explaining how the Current Situation Thesis could be consistent with a plausible story about the kind of justification that agents can have for propositions in Prat. As mentioned in the previous section, Titelbaum (2015, p. 275 ) considers a story, according to which any agent has a priori justification for any true proposition in Prat. Let us simply grant this assumption for the sake of argument. Presumably, the proponent of the Current Situation Thesis must then maintain 17 There are, of course, those who argue that epistemic justification is factive-see, e.g., Littlejohn (2012) , Steglich-Petersen (2013), Sutton (2007) , and Williamson (2000; forthcoming) . However, such philosophers must in any case deny the Possibility of Higher-Order Defeat, since the No Fixed Point Thesis (which is implied by the Possibility of Higher-Order Defeat) says that a particular kind of justified false belief is possible, in which case epistemic justification cannot in general be factive.
that it is possible for an agent to have misleading empirical evidence bearing on the propositions in Prat. Indeed, if we are to make sense of the No Fixed Point Thesis, it must be possible for such misleading empirical evidence to outweigh whatever a priori justification agents have for the truths in Prat. At the same time, however, the proponent of the Current Situation Thesis must maintain that it is impossible for an agent to have strong misleading empirical evidence bearing on those propositions in Prat that concern which doxastic attitudes the agent's current epistemic situation requires or forbids. At least, such misleading empirical evidence must not be able to outweigh the relevant a priori justification, on pain of violating the Substantive Enkratic Principle. Perhaps we should take the second version of Titelbaum's argument to say that this sort of story cannot constitute a viable way of making sense of the Current Situation Thesis, since it leaves us without an explanation of why it is impossible to have strong misleading empirical evidence for those propositions in Prat that concern which doxastic attitudes one's current epistemic situation requires or forbids, when it is possible to have strong misleading empirical evidence for those that do not.
But if this is how we should understand the explanatory challenge, the proponent of the Current Situation Thesis should be on safe ground. After all, anyone who accepts the Substantive Enkratic Principle is committed to the claim that it is impossible to have strong, misleading empirical evidence for those propositions in Prat that concern which doxastic attitudes one's current epistemic situation requires or forbids. So, if the proponent of the Current Situation Thesis faces a distinct challenge, it must be that of explaining why it is nevertheless possible to have strong, misleading empirical evidence for those propositions in Prat that do not concern which doxastic attitudes one's current epistemic situation requires or forbids. And we have already seen that the proponent of the Current Situation Thesis can meet this challenge through careful reflection on cases of higher-order defeat. Effectively, the story I have told about the Parental Bias case is one where Mary at no point is permitted to believe a falsehood in Prat about her current situation, but where she nevertheless ends up being permitted to believe a falsehood in Prat about her previous situation, because she receives strong misleading higher-order evidence in favor of the relevant falsehood in Prat. As I see it, nothing prevents the proponent of the Current Situation Thesis from appealing to this story to make sense of the claim that Mary can have all-things-considered misleading justification for those propositions in Prat that do not concern her current epistemic situation, although she cannot have all-things-considered misleading justification for those that do. If this is right, the proponent of the Current Situation Thesis does indeed have the resources to meet the second version of Titelbaum's explanatory challenge, and hence resist the second version of his argument against the Current Situation Thesis.
Conclusion
In sum, regardless of whether we understand Titelbaum's explanatory challenge to the proponent of the Current Situation Thesis in terms of the kind of justification that one can This obviously does not show that either thesis is true. For all I have said, there might be independent grounds for rejecting either (or both) theses. Yet, given their widespread appeal, I take it to be good news that they can be jointly accepted.
